

# Can input based control strategies be effective?

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**Cobecos – Case study**

**FISHERY GOVERNANCE AND COST OF ENFORCEMENT**

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# Context / rationale of the paper

- ❏ “New assertion”: Failure of the CFP ↔ failure of the control system
- ❏ Our Conference: various initiatives to improve the situation (new regulation, new management schemes...)
- ❏ Aim of the paper: to discuss some aspects of this “new assertion”
- ❏ Argumentation based on a “best practice” example (wrt to management)


# Structure of the paper

1. Presentation of the case study (why a “best practice” example): the Bay of Saint-Brieuc scallops fishery
2. Presentation of the control strategy
  - Key features of the French framework
  - Application to the fishery
3. Discussion of the effectiveness of the system

# 1. The Bay of Saint-Brieuc scallops fishery

- Targeted fishery (specific dredges)
- Sedentary species
- Small vessels (less than 12 meters in general), multi species and multi gears fleet:
  - 📊 Scallops accounted for 28% in value of the total Bay of Saint-Brieuc landings
  - 📊 Fish: 54% in value
  - 📊 Cephalopods: 14% in value
- Inshore / coastal fishery


# 1. The Channel



# 1. The Bay of Saint-Brieuc







# 1. The Bay of Saint-Brieuc







# 1. The (Co)-Management of the fishery

- ➔ Mostly administrative, with individual annual licenses and non-transferable effort quota (hours at sea)  
+ many technical requirements (minimum size, type of dredge, power...)
- ➔ Objectives :
  - 📖 preserving the productivity of the stock
  - 📖 regulating access to the fishery (scallop licenses since 1973 – market organisation)
  - 📖 guaranteeing the socio economic viability of a great(est?) number of fishing firms
- input based measures, associated with output “regulation” (recommended annual catch quotas)

# 1. The Co-Management process

-  The Scientifics (Ifremer) propose a Quota before each fishing season
-  The local and regional fishing committees (fishers representatives) propose a level of nominal fishing effort (fishing hours) for licensees
-  The Administration (Regional Directorate for Maritimes Affairs, representing the State) agrees/validates the proposals
-  The Administration is responsible for controlling compliance with the rules

# 1. Outcomes of the Co-Management process

-  [Graph Number of vessels.ppt](#)
-  [Graph Nominal effort.ppt](#)
-  39 hours per fishing season (45 minutes for each allowed day) – *derby fishing*
-  **BUT** co-funding of the aerial surveillance by fishers

## 2. The control strategy

The French national framework:

- ❏ Six different administrations ( $\neq$  Coast Guards)  
- [Graph\\_National\\_Organisation.ppt](#)
- ❏ Decentralisation:
  - National plan of control
  - Implementation at the regional / local levels
- ❏ Coordination meetings to ensure the consistency at all levels and appropriate reporting

## 2. The control strategy

### Application to the Bay of Saint-Brieuc Scallops fishery:

- Regulations to be controlled:
  - EU/Country wide: logbook, minimum landing size, safety, health, working conditions + compliance with “non fishing rules” (tobacco...)
  - Local: fishing licences, fishing time, full declaration of landings, fishing gear...

Breakdown by administration:  
[Graph\\_Breakdown.ppt](#)

### 3. Discussion of the effectiveness of the system – the Cost side



Staff costs: 8 FTE for local administrations (excl. overhead)

→  $8 \times 41\,000 = 332\,000$  euros (2007)

- ◆ operational costs : around 20 500 euros (2008 – all control activities)
- ◆ Air control: 23 300 € for 122 hours (*i.e.* 190 €/ hour ; 2006-2007)
- ◆ ...excluding other administrations (+ monitoring...)
- ◆ Ratio (cost of control / scallop turnover): 2.5 %

### 3. Discussion of the effectiveness of the system – the Fraud side



Fifas (forthcoming):

- 80 % of the catches officially declared
- 4 %: fraud during the fishing season
- 16%: summer fraud + “breakage”




Direct survey of fishers: 22 %



“Unofficial” estimates: 30 %

# 3. Prosecution in case of infringement for the scallop fishery



### 3. Number of control operations

		Nb of controls
<b>S e a</b>	Air observation	?
	Inspection on board at sea	125
	Inspections on board in port	77
<b>L a n d</b>	Inspection of landings	68
	Inspection of landing in auction	199
	Wholesale inspections	28
	Transport inspection	89
	Fish retailers	157
	Hypermarket	111
	Total	799

	Written record	Number of withdrawals	Number of days of withdrawals
2006-2007	63	54	203

# Assessment of the control strategy

- Rather “good” performance during the fishing season (around 90% of compliance re. declaration of catches)
- Almost all variables are controlled and checked
- Rather good circulation of information (newspaper, experience...)
- ... BUT...

# Assessment of the control strategy

- Most of the fraud takes place outside the fishing season – high marginal cost of abatement
  - The system in place during the fishing season has negative implications on the – private- economic performance
    1. Forced concentration of the supply (from Oct. to April; twice a week)
    2. Low flexibility of fishing operators
    3. Roots of the problem persists
- Trade-off between “efficient” control system and efficient fishing activities